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Abstract—Newly emerging variants of ransomware pose an
ever-growing threat to computer systems governing every aspect
of modern life through the handling and analysis of big data.
While various recent security-based approaches have focused
on detecting and classifying ransomware at the network or
system level, easy-to-use post-infection ransomware classification
for the lay user has not been attempted before. In this paper,
we investigate the possibility of classifying the ransomware a
system is infected with simply based on a screenshot of the splash
screen or the ransom note captured using a consumer camera
commonly found in any modern mobile device. To train and
evaluate our system, we create a sample dataset of the splash
screens of 50 well-known ransomware variants. In our dataset,
only a single training image is available per ransomware. Instead
of creating a large training dataset of ransomware screenshots,
we simulate screenshot capture conditions via carefully designed
data augmentation techniques, enabling simple and efficient one-
shot learning. Moreover, using model uncertainty obtained via
Bayesian approximation, we ensure special input cases such
as unrelated non-ransomware images and previously-unseen
ransomware variants are correctly identified for special handling
and not mis-classified. Extensive experimental evaluation demon-
strates the efficacy of our work, with accuracy levels of up to
93.6% for ransomware classification.
Index Terms—Machine Learning, Ransomware Classification,
Model Uncertainty, Bayesian Approximation, One-Shot Learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the increasingly prominent role of the internet in
various facets of modern life, any malicious online activity
has the potential to disrupt the social order, sometimes with
dire repercussions. Of the numerous variants of malware often
spread for economic gain, ransomware has recently received
significant attention within the cybersecurity community [1]
due to its wide range of targets, the significant harm it can
inflict on the victims, the great financial incentive it provides
for organised crime syndicates and its constant evolution,
allowing its variants to regularly bypass state-of-the-art anti-
virus and anti-malware [2].
There are, in essence, two types of ransomware: locker
ransomware, which locks the targeted system and prevents
or constrains user access, but is often easily resolvable for
a technically-savvy user, and crypto-ransomware, which can
be significantly more difficult to deal with and can lead to
irreversible harm as it encrypts files within the targeted system.
A third type of ransomware, called scareware, attempts to scare
Fig. 1: Examples from our dataset: training images (ran-
somware splash screens - top), positive test data (screenshots
of ransomware splash screens - middle) and negative test data
(unrelated images for uncertainty evaluation - bottom).
lay users into paying the ransom without actually damaging
the computer in any way [3] only using an intimidating splash
screen. This substantial level of diversity among ransomware
variants gives significant importance to a robust classification
system that could easily identify the ransomware and guide
the victims towards appropriate support.
Various classification and detection techniques within the
existing literature [1], [4], [5] facilitate identifying and coun-
tering ransomware attacks for technically-adept individuals
and organisations with a large security and IT infrastructure.
However, ransomware classification methods tailored towards
the laypersons, which make up the majority of users and are
often targeted easily, are scarce. In this paper, we propose
an image classification pipeline, which enables any individual
to identify the variant of the ransomware they are infected
with based on a screenshot of the splash screen or the ransom
note casually captured using a consumer-grade camera, such
as those commonly found in any modern mobile phone.
While a significant portion of the literature on classification
has been dedicated to achieving consistent high-accuracy
results using a variety of optimised deep neural networks
[6]–[13], most of these techniques require large quantities of
accurately-labelled data, which for our task, translates to a
large corpus of splash screen images captured from computer
screens under different environmental conditions (lighting,
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Fig. 2: Examples of augmentation methods used to simulate
screenshot capture: defocus blur (top), motion blur (bottom).
field of view, camera angle, etc.) varied enough to simulate
any future image capture and thus avoid over-fitting. A naı¨ve
solution to the data requirement problem would be to accept
the considerable costs and resources required to create such a
large dataset, but in this work, we attempt to circumvent the
need for big data by recreating the conditions that lead to the
appearance of a screenshot by means of carefully designed
and tuned data augmentation techniques. In essence, our one-
shot learning framework is capable of classifying any image
of a ransomware splash screen captured using a camera by
only ever seeing a single original image for each class of
ransomware. This enables our approach to rapidly learn to
classify new variants if the model is simply retrained or fine-
tuned using a single training image. Consequently, our dataset
consists of a single image per variant of ransom note or splash
screen for training and ten screenshots of said ransom notes
captured using a mobile phone camera for testing (Figure 1).
Additionally, modern neural-based classification approaches
are notoriously known for attempting to classify inputs on
which they have not been trained [14] or completely miss-
classifying images sampled from distributions with slight
deviations from the training set [15]. This means an off-the-
shelf approach will wrongly classify any unrelated input (e.g.
non-ransomware images, images of new ransomware variants
unknown to the existing model, carefully-designed adversarial
examples), sometimes with a high degree of confidence. To
remedy this, we turn towards the recent advances in variational
inference and its implications in calculating model uncertainty
in neural networks [16]–[20]. Not only does the integration of
Bayesian inference into a neural network make it more robust
against adversarial attacks, access to model uncertainty enables
the network to reject irrelevant inputs sampled from outside
the distribution of the training data. The inclusion of model
uncertainty calculations in our pipeline requires its very own
evaluation methodology, for which purpose, we also include a
negative test set (Figure 1 – bottom) in our dataset to assess
our uncertainty values. This dataset consists of unrelated input
images which the model should be uncertain about as it has
not been trained to classify such images. In short, the primary
contributions of this work are as follows:
Fig. 3: The custom architecture used in our experiments.
• Ransomware Classification: We provide a simple pipeline
that enables any laypersons to identify the variant of
ransomware they have been infected with by casually
taking a photograph of their computer screen displaying
the ransom note or splash screen.
• One-Shot Learning through Data Augmentation: We in-
vestigate the possibility of using different data augmenta-
tion techniques to simulate the appearance of a screenshot
given the original splash screen, thereby enabling training
on a single data point per class with significant general-
isation capabilities.
• Model Uncertainty via Bayesian Approximation: We ex-
plore the use of various forms of Bayesian inference to
further improve generalisation and obtain model uncer-
tainty to avoid classifying unrelated images and as-of-
yet-unknown variants of ransomware.
To enable easier reproducibility, the source code, pre-trained
models and the dataset will be publicly available.1.
II. RELATED WORK
We consider relevant prior work over three distinct areas,
ransomware classification and detection (Section II-A), one-
shot learning (Section II-B), and Bayesian approximation
(Section II-C).
A. Ransomware Classification and Detection
Traditionally, malware activities are either detected at the
network level [21], [22], system level [23] or even both [24].
Andronio [25] identifies device-locking or encryption activities
by finding code paths using static taint analysis along with
symbolic execution. Anomalous file system activities have
also been used to detect ransomware [26]. In another work,
abnormal system behaviour is identified based on changes in
file type, similarity measurements and entropy [27].
More recently, machine learning based approaches have
become prevalent in detecting and/or classifying ransomware.
Sgandurra et al. [28] detect and classify ransomware by
dynamically analysing the behaviour of applications during the
early phases of their installation. In another work [5], detection
and classification of ransomware is made possible by combin-
ing a static detection phase based on the frequency of opcodes
1https://github.com/atapour/ransomware-classification
Fig. 4: Confusion matrices for the better performing models (DenseNet-201 [9], DenseNet-161 [9], ShuffleNet-V2 [11],
Inception-V3 [10], ResNeXt-101 [13], MobileNet-V2 [12], ResNet-101 [7] and VGG-19 [6]) trained using our data
augmentation techniques. All the models have been pre-trained on ImageNet. Note that despite the imbalanced training dataset
and the difficulty of generalisation, most models are capable of producing accurate and balanced results.
prior to installation and a dynamic method which investigates
the use of CPU, memory and network as well as call statistics
during run-time. Vinayakumar et al. [29] explores the use of
neural networks with a focus on tuning the hyperparameters
and the architecture of a very simple multilayer perceptron to
detect and classify ransomware activities.
While the use of various machine learning techniques have
led to significant improvements in the field of ransomware
detection and classification, these approaches are mostly tai-
lored towards technical users or potential integration into
various anti-virus and anti-malware applications. The approach
proposed here mainly focuses on classifying ransomware after
the system has been infected based on an image of the splash
screen or the ransom note casually taken by any layperson.
B. One-Shot Learning
Recent advances in modern machine learning techniques
have resulted in remarkable strides in various active areas of
research, including image classification [6], semantic scene
understanding [30]–[32], natural language processing [33] and
graph representations [34], [35]. However, one of the main
requirements of all such approaches is access to a large corpus
of data for extensive iterative training, which is often not
readily available or intractable to obtain.
This has led to the creation of an entire field of research
with a focus on the daunting task of training machine learning
algorithms using one data point. The seminal work by Fei et
al. [36] popularised the idea of one-shot learning by proposing
a variational Bayesian framework for image classification by
leveraging previously-learned classes to aid in the classifica-
tion of unseen ones. Their promising results inspired a slew
of researchers to use novel one-shot learning techniques to
tackle various other problems and applications. For instance,
to address the problem of character classification, Lake et
al. model the character drawing process to decompose the
image into smaller chucks and a structural explanation is
subsequently given for the observed pixels. The same process
has been used for speech primitives along with Bayesian
inference to identify new words from unknown speakers [37].
Siamese neural networks have been used to rank similarity
between inputs [38]. This similarity prediction is then utilised
to classify not only new data but entirely new classes, by
measuring the similarity between the new entries. A memory-
augmented neural network is proposed by Santoro et al. [39]
that learns how to store and retrieve memories to use for each
classification task. Vinyals et al. [40] propose a network that
maps a small labelled support set and an unlabelled example
to its label, enabling adaptation to new data.
Cheny et al. [41] attempt to learn a mapping between new
data samples and concepts in a high-dimensional semantic
space. The newly mapped concepts are subsequently matched
Network Pretrained(ImageNet)
Evaluation Metrics (higher, better)
Accuracy F1 Score AUC
SqueezeNet [8] 7 0.640 0.622 0.816
SqueezeNet [8] 3 0.734 0.714 0.864
VGG-19 [6] 7 0.670 0.661 0.832
VGG-19 [6] 3 0.790 0.784 0.893
ResNet-101 [7] 7 0.782 0.773 0.889
ResNet-101 [7] 3 0.876 0.872 0.937
MobileNet-V2[12] 7 0.804 0.799 0.900
MobileNet-V2[12] 3 0.892 0.883 0.945
ResNeXt-101 [13] 7 0.786 0.775 0.891
ResNeXt-101 [13] 3 0.898 0.896 0.948
Inception-V3 [10] 7 0.816 0.812 0.906
Inception-V3 [10] 3 0.906 0.904 0.952
ShuffleNet-V2[11] 7 0.774 0.764 0.885
ShuffleNet-V2[11] 3 0.910 0.905 0.954
DenseNet-161 [9] 7 0.816 0.806 0.906
DenseNet-161 [9] 3 0.928 0.926 0.963
DenseNet-201 [9] 7 0.848 0.837 0.917
DenseNet-201 [9] 3 0.936 0.937 0.967
TABLE I: Results of state-of-the-art classification networks
using our data augmentation techniques. Higher resolution
images (256 × 256) are used for training and testing.
against existing ones and new instance features are synthe-
sised by interpolating among the concepts to facilitate better
learning. More similar to our work, Zhao et al. [42] directly
leverage data augmentation for one-shot learning. In this paper,
we also utilise a series of carefully-selected data augmentation
techniques to train a classification model based on a single data
point per class. Whilst our pipeline is unable to generalise to
entirely new classes, we rely on using Bayesian inference to
identify previously unseen new classes.
C. Model Uncertainty via Bayesian Approximation
In modern applied machine learning, uncertainty is gaining
an ever-increasing level of importance, mainly due to the
role it can play in detecting and averting adversarial attacks
[43], ensuring system safety in critical infrastructure [44] and
analysing and preventing failure in robotics and navigation
applications [45], among others. Similarly, in our work, un-
certainty estimates can be a valuable tool that can ensure
new previously-unseen variants of ransomware or completely
irrelevant inputs, such as those mistakenly selected by the user,
are correctly identified, since explicit handling and treatment
is required for these special cases.
A simple and efficient technique widely used in the liter-
ature to calculate model uncertainty is Bayesian inference,
with dropout [46] used as a pragmatic approximation [16].
In a dropout inference approach, the neural network is trained
with dropout applied before every weight layer and during
testing, the output is obtained by randomly dropping neurons
to generate samples from the model distributions. Gal et al.
[16] demonstrate that the use of dropout inference is mathe-
matically equivalent to the probabilistic deep Gaussian process
approximation [47], with the approach effectively minimising
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the model distribu-
Network # Parameters Evaluation Metrics (higher, better)
Accuracy F1 Score AUC
Inception-V3 [10] 25,214,714 0.626 0.591 0.809
ShuffleNet-V2[11] 1,304,854 0.628 0.604 0.810
VGG-19 [6] 139,786,098 0.630 0.609 0.811
SqueezeNet [8] 748,146 0.634 0.613 0.813
ResNet-101 [7] 42,602,610 0.664 0.642 0.829
MobileNet-V2[12] 2,287,922 0.666 0.648 0.830
ResNeXt-101 [13] 86,844,786 0.674 0.659 0.834
DenseNet-201 [9] 18,188,978 0.720 0.704 0.857
DenseNet-161 [9] 26,582,450 0.744 0.734 0.870
Custom Network 1,875,666 0.716 0.703 0.855
TABLE II: Results of state-of-the-art classification architec-
tures and our custom-made light-weight network. Lower res-
olution images (128 × 128) are used to reduce the number of
parameters and increase the rate of convergence.
tion and the posterior of a deep Gaussian process, marginalised
over its finite rank covariance function parameters [16].
While the use of such an approach [16] can yield a
reasonable estimate of model uncertainty (as demonstrated in
Section IV-C), to obtain better-calibrated uncertainty that fits
the nature of the data at hand, the dropout rate at each layer
must be adapted to the data as a variational parameter. This is
often accomplished using an extensive grid-search [17] which
is computationally-intensive, time-consuming, and completely
intractable for certain tasks, which points to the importance of
an adaptive dropout rate in a variational framework.
Kingma et al. [18] thus propose variational dropout, which
attempts to model Bayesian inference using a posterior fac-
torised over individual network weights wi ∈ W , q(w) =
N (θ, αθ2) for all individual mean parameters θi ∈ θ. The
prior factorises similarly and is explicitly selected so the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between the model distribution
and the posterior q(W ) is independent of the mean pa-
rameters θ. Additionally, Kingma et al. [18] claim that
their reparametrisation technique maps uncertainty about the
weights of the model into independent local noise. Subse-
quently, an extension to the conventional Gaussian multiplica-
tive dropout [46] is proposed that allows for the dropout
rate to be learned as a parameter. However, more recent
studies [19], [20] have demonstrated that the log-uniform prior
used for variational dropout [18] may not lead to a proper
posterior, which means variational dropout is a non-Bayesian
sparsification approach and the uncertainty estimated based on
q(W ) may not follow the usual Bayesian interpretation.
Conversely, Gal et al. [17] resolve the issue of the im-
proper prior and posterior and propose the use of learnable
dropout rate parameters optimised towards obtaining better
uncertainty rather than maximising model performance. By
introducing a dropout regularisation term, which only depends
on the dropout rate, the approach ensures that the posterior
approximated by the dropout itself does not deviate too far
from the model distribution. In this paper, we make use of all
three approaches [16]–[18] to obtain uncertainty and assess
the performance and efficacy of each using our data.
Augmentation Method Evaluation Metrics (higher, better)
Accuracy F1 Score AUC
None 0.252 0.258 0.618
Contrast 0.386 0.379 0.687
Rotation 0.440 0.414 0.714
Brightness 0.404 0.402 0.696
Perspective 0.524 0.500 0.757
Motion Blur 0.338 0.348 0.662
Defocus Blur 0.324 0.324 0.655
Gaussian Blur 0.312 0.289 0.649
Random Noise 0.344 0.343 0.665
Random Occlusion 0.344 0.339 0.665
Colour Perturbations 0.330 0.325 0.658
All Augmentations 0.716 0.703 0.855
TABLE III: Numerical results demonstrating the importance of
the augmentation techniques (Section III-B) used for training.
III. APPROACH
The primary objective of this work is to investigate the
possibility of classifying the variant of ransomware a system is
infected with solely based on an image of the splash screen or
the ransom note captured from a computer screen (or mobile
device) using a consumer camera. This is accomplished by
training a classifier on a single original image of the splash
screen of each ransomware. In the following, we will outline
the details of the our dataset, data augmentation techniques
and the different networks used to carry out the classification.
A. Training Dataset
To explore the potentials of our ransomware classification
pipeline, we train our model on a dataset of splash screens
and ransom notes of 50 different variants of ransomware. A
single image of a splash screen variant is available for each
of the ransomware classes available in our dataset. However,
certain ransomware classes are associated with more than
one splash screen (i.e. certain classes contain more than one
training image but those images depict different splash screens
associated with the same class), which significantly adds to
the difficulty of the problem as this leads to a training data
imbalance and can lead to training instability.
To test the performance of the approach, a balanced test
set of 500 images (10 images per class) is created by casu-
ally taking screenshots of the ransomware images using two
different types of camera phones (Apple and Android) from
6 different computer screens (with varying specifications, e.g.
size, resolution, aspect ratio, panel type, screen coating and
colour depth). We call this the positive test dataset since all
the images within this dataset need to be positively identified
as ransomware and any model trained using our dataset should
be certain about the predictions it makes with respect to the
ransomware variants it has already observed.
An additional set of 50 unrelated and/or non-ransomware
images are captured from the same computer screens (under
the same conditions as our positive test images) to evaluate the
uncertainty estimates acquired using our Bayesian networks.
We refer to this portion of our dataset as the negative test
dataset, as any model trained on our dataset should be very
uncertain about this data since these screenshot images are not
of, and therefore should not be classified as, any ransomware
known to the model. Examples of the training and positive and
negative test images are shown in Figure 1. Note that some
of the images in our negative test set (Figure 1 – bottom)
are very similar in appearance to what a ransomware splash
screen could look like. This has been purposefully designed
so the uncertainty values estimated by the model can be more
rigorously assessed.
Using our carefully designed augmentation techniques, we
train the models on our training dataset of 66 images in 50
classes. In the following, we will briefly outline the details of
our data augmentation techniques.
B. Data Augmentation
During training, the network can only see the single image
available for each splash screen variant. This lack of training
data can significantly hinder generalisation as the model would
simply overfit to the training distribution or memorise the few
training images it has seen. This means a model trained on
our training dataset without any modification or augmentation
would be incapable of classifying images captured under test
conditions from a computer screen (Section IV-B).
To prevent this, a carefully designed and tuned set of
augmentation techniques is applied to the training images on
the fly to simulate the test conditions (images casually captured
from a computer screen). The hyper-parameters associated
with these augmentation techniques (e.g. thresholds, intensity)
are determined using exhaustive grid-searches which are ex-
cluded here. Each of the following augmentation techniques is
randomly applied (both in terms of application and severity):
(1) rotation: randomly rotating the image with the angle of
rotation in the range [-90◦,90◦], (2) contrast: randomly chang-
ing the image contrast by up to a factor of 2, (3) brightness:
randomly changing the brightness by up to a factor of 3,
(4) occlusion: to primarily simulate distractors such as screen
glare and reflection mostly in glossy screens (up to a quarter
of the image size occluded with random elliptical shapes of
randomly selected bright colours), (5) Gaussian blur: with a
radius of up to 5, (6) motion blur: simulating blurring effects
caused by the movement of the camera during image capture
(up to a movement length of 9 pixels – see Figure 2 - bottom),
(7) defocus blur: simulating the camera being out of focus
which is a common occurrence when a computer screen is
being photographed (up to a kernel size of 9 – see Figure 2 -
top), (8) noise: Gaussian noise up to a level of 0.2, (9) colour
perturbations: randomising hue by a maximum of 5% and
saturating colours by a factor of up to 2, and (10) perspective:
by up to 50% over each axis to simulate the varying camera
angles when a screen is being photographed.
By using random combinations of all the different aug-
mentation methods applied to our training set with varying
probabilities, very high levels of accuracy can be achieved
(see Section IV). In the following section, we will focus
Augmentation Evaluation Metrics (higher, better) Augmentation Evaluation Metrics (higher, better)
Accuracy F1 Score AUC Accuracy F1 Score AUC
P/R/B/C/N/O/M/CP/D/G 0.716 0.703 0.855 P/R/B/C/N 0.616 0.609 0.782
P/R/B/C/N/O/M/CP/D 0.690 0.681 0.842 P/R/B/C 0.606 0.592 0.776
P/R/B/C/N/O/M/CP 0.674 0.658 0.821 P/R/B 0.592 0.580 0.771
P/R/B/C/N/O/M 0.648 0.632 0.805 P/R 0.586 0.569 0.762
P/R/B/C/N/O 0.634 0.628 0.797 P 0.524 0.500 0.757
TABLE IV: Evaluating the performance of the combined augmentation techniques. C: Contrast; R: Rotation; B: Brightness;
P: Perspective; M: Motion blur; D: Defocus blur; G: Gaussian blur; N: Noise; O: Occlusion; CP: Colour Perturbation.
on the details of the classification models and the network
architectures that take advantage of these data augmentation
techniques used within our approach to classify ransomware
based on our training dataset.
C. Classification Model
A very effective way of solving the problem of ransomware
classification is to use to the augmentation methods outlined in
Section III-B along with any of the many optimised classifica-
tion networks in the literature [6]–[13]. Most of these networks
are capable of yielding very high-accuracy results, especially
when taking advantage of the boosted features that can be
obtained by pre-training the network on large datasets such
as ImageNet (Table I). However, it is important to note that
despite the recent introduction of more efficient light-weight
networks [8], [11], [12], the majority of the state-of-the-art
classification models make use of very deep architectures and
contain an extremely large number of parameters (Table II).
An important part of this work is to enable an accurate mea-
surement of model uncertainty via Bayesian approximation,
and as explained in Section II-C, this can be accomplished with
a reasonable degree of mathematical accuracy by applying a
dropout layer before every weight layer within the model.
This can be highly problematic for very deep networks [6],
[7], [10] since the large number of dropout layers in such
networks would make convergence intractable. While simply
reducing the number of dropout layers in a very deep network
can help with the convergence problem [16], it comes at a cost
of the precision of the uncertainty values since it would not
be possible to accurately calibrate the uncertainty estimation
process if some layers contain neurons that cannot be dropped.
To remedy this issue and for the sake of experimental
consistency, we propose a simplified custom architecture, seen
in Figure 3. This light-weight network takes an image of size
128 × 128 as its input and after six convolutional layers and
three max-pooling operations produces a feature vector of
4096 dimensions. This is subsequently passed into a fully-
connected layer which classifies the input into one of 50
classes. Training is accomplished via a cross entropy loss
function. No normalization is performed in the network. To
approximate Bayesian inference, a dropout layer can be placed
after every weight layer in the network. Figure 3 shows an
outline of our custom network architecture, with the dropout
layers optionally used to approximate Bayesian inference.
Fig. 5: Test accuracy of our custom network with fixed dropout
[16], concrete dropout [17] and variational dropout [18] layers
as the models are trained for 25,000 iterations.
We utilise the Bayesian dropout techniques [16]–[18] to
calculate model uncertainty via Monte Carlo sampling. After
N stochastic forward passes of the same input X (images)
through the network to produce the output Y (class labels),
the predictive mean of the model is as follows:
E(Y) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
Y′n. (1)
The predictive uncertainty is thus obtained as follows:
Var(Y) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
Y′n
T
Y′n − E(Y)TE(Y). (2)
The dropout rate can be set as a fixed hyper-parameter tuned
to the data via intensive grid-searches (0.05 in our case for
all six dropout layers in the network) or learned as model
parameters [17], [18]. In Section IV-C, we experiment with all
these variations of Bayesian approximation through dropout to
enable further insight into the functionality of our model and
uncertainty measurements in general.
D. Implementation Details
The image data in our training and test sets are all of
different resolutions but for the sake of consistency, they are
all cropped to a square with the length equal to the smaller
Fig. 6: Comparing the uncertainty values as our custom network is trained with fixed dropout [16] (FDO), concrete dropout
[17] (CDO) and variational dropout [18] (VDO) layers. All models demonstrate higher levels of uncertainty on the negative
test dataset (red) than on the positive test images (blue).
dimension of the image (random cropping for training images
and centre cropping for test images) and resized to an image
of dimensions 128× 128 for our custom network architecture
or 256× 256 to achieve higher accuracy results using deeper
convolutional networks. The non-linearity module used in our
custom architecture is leaky ReLU (slope = 0.2). The training
data imbalance issue is handled by weighting the inputs in
the loss function according to the frequency of their class
within the overall dataset. All models are trained to 100,000
steps. The implementation is done in PyTorch [48], with Adam
[49] empirically providing the best optimization (β1 = 0.5,
β2 = 0.999, α = 0.0002).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate our work using extensive
experimental analysis. The results of various state-of-the-art
classification approaches are evaluated and using ablation stud-
ies, we demonstrate the importance of our data augmentation
approaches. Additionally, using our positive and negative test
datasets, we investigate the effectiveness of model uncertainty
values obtained through Bayesian approximation via dropout.
A. State-of-the-Art Classification
To achieve the highest possible levels of accuracy, we train
various state-of-the-art image classification networks [6]–[13].
With relatively high-resolution images (256 × 256) used as
inputs, accuracy levels of up to 93.6% can be achieved using
our full augmentation protocol and a DenseNet-201 network
[9] pre-trained on ImageNet.
Table I contains the numerical results obtained from dif-
ferent architectures across various metrics with inputs of size
256 × 256. As seen in Table I, the representation learning
encapsulated within the model resulting from the features
obtained by pre-training the network on ImageNet is an
invaluable asset and can lead to performance boosts of up
to 14% for some of the networks.
As indicated by the high F1 score, despite the uneven class
distribution in our training dataset, using our class balancing
efforts (Section III-D), most networks are capable of learning
about all the classes in an evenly distributed manner. The
high AUC (Area Under the Curve) values also demonstrate
the great leaning capabilities of the models which are able
to easily distinguish between the classes with little confusion.
The confusion matrices for some of the models [6], [7], [9]–
[13] shown in Figure 4 further confirm these findings and point
to the strong feature learning capabilities of the models.
An important aspect of our work, however, is training and
inference efficiency. Fast convergence during training can be
intractable in very deep models when dropout is utilised as
Bayesian approximation to obtain model uncertainty. Since
our approach is meant to specifically accommodate lay users
through a web server, a light-weight model that can be used
for efficient deployment is very important to reduce the chance
of high load and hence denial of service.
To address the issues of efficiency and convergence rate
and to guarantee better experimental consistency, we evaluate
our custom architecture network that takes smaller (128 ×
128) images as its input compared against state-of-the-art
deep and light-weight networks commonly used within the
literature, when receiving the same small (128 × 128) images
as their input. As seen in Table II, our simpler network
outperforms most deeper and light-weight networks [6]–[8],
[10]–[13] while remaining competitive with the rest [9]. The
superior performance of our simple architecture is mainly due
to the fact that the number of its layers and parameters are
carefully tuned to the dataset (using preliminary architecture
searches, which have been excluded for brevity).
B. Ablation Studies
One of our primary contributions is the ability to train
an accurate ransomware screenshot classifier using a single
training image for each variant of splash screen or ransom
note. This is achieved using ten carefully-designed augmen-
tation techniques (Section III-B), the combination of which
will result in the simulation of a screenshot of a ransomware
splash screen captured using a consumer-grade camera. Con-
sequently, a substantial part of our experimental setup has
been to demonstrate the importance of each of these aug-
mentation techniques to ensure that they positively contribute
to the improved performance of the model. To accomplish
Fig. 7: Examples demonstrating the effectiveness of model uncertainty, using positive test data (screenshots of images from
the training set – top) and negative test data (unrelated images that should not be classified – bottom). MC: Monte Carlo
sampling; FDO: Fixed dropout [16]; CDO: Concrete dropout [17]; VDO: Variational dropout [18].
this, we train our custom network (with no dropout) using
individual augmentation techniques to measure their effects
on the results. Table III contains the results of our custom
network when trained on individual augmentation methods.
As expected, not using any augmentation leads to a poor
performance from the model, while significantly better results
can be achieved when all the augmentation methods are com-
bined. We also experimented with random combinations of the
techniques to empirically investigate any incompatibility, but
found that all augmentation techniques used here contribute to
the improvement of the results, as seen in Table IV.
As seen in Tables III and IV, perspective and rotation have
the greatest influence over the results. In our experiments with
additional augmentation techniques, we found that horizontally
flipping the images results in worse model performance since
the test set does not contain any mirror images, as modern
consumer cameras do not produce mirrored outputs. We also
interestingly found that adding vertical flipping to the mix
of our augmentation techniques had no impact on the results
as the effects of this augmentation methods can be achieved
through rotation. As a result, image flipping was removed from
the list of augmentation techniques used in our approach.
C. Model Uncertainty
Another important component of this work is the ability
of the model to calculate uncertainty, therefore enabling the
identification of unrelated input images (e.g. non-ransomware
inputs and new previously-unseen ransomware images). Our
custom network (Figure 3) is consequently trained with the
three different dropout modules [16]–[18] used for Bayesian
approximation. Dropout layers are kept in place during in-
ference and uncertainty is calculated as per Eqn. 2 via Monte
Carlo sampling of the network weights. Recent work [19], [20]
argue that the use of variational dropout [18] does not lead to
proper Bayesian behaviour and can result in overfitting. This
notion is somewhat confirmed by our experiments. A seen in
Figure 5, our network trained with variational dropout is prone
to overfitting and produces lower test accuracy levels.
Moreover, by calculating model uncertainty when the model
is evaluated using our positive and negative test data, we can
assess the effectiveness of our uncertainty values. One would
expect the model to be very uncertain when negative test
images (unrelated images) are passed in as inputs, while the
uncertainty values should be smaller when positive test data
(ransomware screenshots) are seen by the network. As seen in
Figure 6, our experiments point to the same conclusions with
uncertainty values being significantly higher in the presence
of negative data. Interestingly, as seen in Figure 6, a fixed
dropout rate (FDO) [16] produces cleaner and more accurate
uncertainty values despite the intensive computation required
to determine the dropout rate (0.05 for all layers in our case).
Approach Test Data Evaluation Metrics (higher, better) Uncertainty and Confidence
Accuracy F1 Score AUC Model Uncertainty Mean Confidence
Fixed Dropout [16]
Positive 0.708 0.7011 0.8429 0.015 0.85 ± 0.21
Negative – – – 0.330 0.66 ± 0.25
Concrete Dropout [17]
Positive 0.698 0.6771 0.8459 0.067 0.87 ± 0.19
Negative – – – 0.218 0.72 ± 0.29
Variational Dropout [18]
Positive 0.6821 0.6593 0.8378 0.084 0.86 ± 0.22
Negative – – – 0.175 0.71 ± 0.23
TABLE V: Numerical results of different Bayesian approximation methods [16]–[18] to obtain model uncertainty. As expected
the models have low uncertainty for the positive test data (screenshots of ransom notes in the training set) and high uncertainty
for negative test images (unrelated images and new ransomware variants)
Figure 7 shows the confidence and uncertainty values ob-
tained for a small number of randomly-selected examples from
our positive and negative test datasets. As expected, confi-
dence values (softmax outputs) are essentially meaningless and
contain very little information about how much the network
actually knows about the image, while uncertainty values
are a better indicator of whether the network has sufficient
knowledge of the input image or not. For our best-performing
model (fixed dropout), an uncertainty value of 0.12 seems to be
a reasonable estimated threshold, beyond which the predictions
of the model are not credible. Similar conclusions can be
drawn from Table V, which contains the numerical results
of the Bayesian approximation methods [16]–[18] applied to
positive and negative test data. As seen in Table V, the mean
uncertainty values are an order of magnitude higher for the
negative test images than they are for the positive images, and
the confidence values have such a high standard deviation that
their use to measure how much the model knows about the
input it has received can lead to very misleading results.
V. DISCUSSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
As discussed in Section IV-A, we are able to achieve high
accuracy results using our augmentation techniques and deep
convolutional neural networks such as DenseNet [9]. However,
since another important component of our work, model uncer-
tainty, relies on introducing a dropout layer after every weight
layer within the model, convergence for very deep models such
as DenseNet [9] would be almost impossible, which is why
we opt for using our own simplified network architecture.
While this can sufficiently meet the requirements of our
application through a possible two-stage solution (the light-
weight network measures the uncertainty of the model with
respect to the input and if the value is low and special handling
is not required, the deep network can be subsequently used to
conduct the actual classification), future work can involve the
use of Bayesian modules within each layer [50] or a Bayesian
last layer in the network [51], thus enabling the optimisation of
much deeper networks with plausible uncertainty calculation
capabilities. Additionally, if the parameters of the augmen-
tation techniques could be learned during training instead of
being laboriously tuned through extensive grid searches, the
resulting efficient and stable training procedure can lead to
superior model performance.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we explore the possibility of performing the
task of ransomware classification based on a simple screenshot
of the splash screen or ransom note captured using a consumer
camera found in any modern mobile phone. To make this
possible, we create a sample dataset with only a single
image available for every variant of ransomware splash screen.
Instead of creating a large corpus of ransomware screenshot
images for training, we opt for simulating the conditions
that lead to the appearance of a screenshot image through
carefully designed data augmentation techniques, resulting in
a very simple one-shot learning procedure. Additionally, we
employ various Bayesian approximation approaches [16]–[18]
to obtain model uncertainty. Using uncertainty values, we are
then able to identify special input cases such as unrelated non-
ransomware images and new previously-unseen ransomware
variants that our trained models are able or expected to
classify. These particular input cases can be set aside for
special handling. Using extensive experimental evaluation, we
have demonstrated that test accuracy levels of up to 93.6% can
be achieved using our full augmentation protocol and a deep
network such as DenseNet [9]. Assessments using our negative
test dataset (images unknown to the model) also indicate that
our custom architecture trained with [16]–[18] is capable of
accurately estimating uncertainty values.
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